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Abstract 
Starting in the early 1990s, Republican and Democratic elites and legislators moved toward polar 
opposite stands on environmental and global warming issues, yet rank-and-file voters remained less 
divided and more open to environmental protections. In 2006, when it looked as if most of the public 
might support government action to deal with global warming, right-wing media moguls and free-
market advocates mounted a successful campaign to convince rank and file conservatives that climate 
science is a hoax and new regulations would hurt the economy. By 2007, pressures from below and 
outside Washington made compromise impossible for GOPers. Oblivious to this shift, supporters of 
cap and trade kept trying to strike bargains with business leaders and Senate Republicans. They failed 
to build support across the country, and presented an anemic message that did nothing to counter 
worries that new carbon caps could leave families paying higher energy prices from shrinking 
incomes. Most supporters of carbon capping recognize that the post-2010 Congress will not act as long 
as Republicans wary of challenges from the right remain in charge. But what happens when another 
opening comes – for example, if Democrats take control in 2016 or 2018? To be prepared when the 
next opening arises in Congress, organizational efforts must reach far beyond the Beltway – to knit 
together alliances and inspire tens of millions of ordinary Americans to push for change 
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Global warming poses a rapidly increasing threat to human communities around the globe, and it has 
been clear to experts for some time that major changes in the production and use of energy must be 
adopted soon if future damage is to be limited.  As one of the world’s major powers and an engine of 
the world economy, the United States is pivotal here.  Europe, China, and many other polities must 
also take action, but the United States needs to be in the lead if global solutions are to take hold.   
Economy-wide shifts in the costs of various sources of energy are, in turn, part of what the United 
States needs to accomplish – including caps or taxes on carbon energy to ratchet down its use. 
In 2009 and 2010, during the first two years of the presidency of Barack Obama, it briefly 
looked as if the United States would start to move in the direction of economy wide action to combat 
global warming.  Hefty Washington DC players had worked together in the U.S. Climate Action 
Partnership (otherwise known as USCAP), a coalition of business chieftains and leaders of big 
environmental organizations that was publicly launched in 2007 to push legislation to place a cap on 
carbon emissions and create an open market for energy producers to trade allowances under the cap. 
Once legislated, caps were meant to be slowly ratcheted down in future decades, so U.S. companies 
and citizens would have an incentive to use less carbon-based energy and invest in green technologies. 
This “cap and trade” approach was seen by supporters as a quintessentially market-oriented way to 
nudge the vast U.S. economy through a gradual transition to reliance on sources of energy that would 
do less damage to the climate.  The model originated with economists looking to harness market 
forces and found some favor with major corporations and Republicans, so it seemed to be a good bet 
for building bipartisan coalitions in the U.S. Congress.1 Votes from some Republicans would be 
essential, because votes for carbon caps would be hard to find among Democrats representing states 
like Louisiana and West Virginia with strong coal or oil sectors or states in the Midwest heavily reliant 
on electricity generated in coal-fired plants.  
To many savvy players, prospects for a legislative push for cap and trade looked excellent 
during and right after the presidential campaign of 2008. Versions of this approach were touted not 
just by the Democratic nominee and eventual victor Barack Obama, but also by the 2008 Republican 
standard-bearer, John McCain – who was one of the favorite GOPers among big environmentalists, 
because he had repeatedly co-sponsored carbon-control bills. Environmentalists who favored cap and 
trade presumed that John McCain would be on their side – it was just a question of when they could 
make it possible for him to play a pivotal role in forging a bipartisan deal in the Senate. With 
Democratic president Barack Obama moving into the White House in early 2009 and Democratic 
House and Senate leaders pledged to act on climate legislation, the time looked ripe to move full speed 
ahead. On January 15, 2009, USCAP leaders issued a meticulously negotiated blueprint for a new cap 
and trade system and geared up for non-stop lobbying to get legislation through Congress.2 Visions 
danced in their heads of a celebratory White House signing ceremony nicely timed to tee up U.S. 
leadership in the next international climate confab scheduled for December 2009 in Copenhagen.   
Following months of intricate bargaining, USCAP forces scored an initial, hard-fought 
success when, on June 29, 2009, the House of Representatives passed the Waxman-Markey 
“American Clean Energy and Security” bill by a vote of 219 to 212.  Supporters were elated, but they 
got a big shock almost at once as oppositional lobbying and media campaigns went into overdrive and 
fierce grassroots Tea Party protests broke out.   During the summer Congressional recess, telegenic 
older white protestors carrying homemade signs appeared at normally sleepy “town hall” sessions to 
harangue Congressional Democrats who supported health reform as well as the Waxman-Markey bill. 
Protests were bolstered by generously funded advertising campaigns targeted on Senators who would 
be asked to decide about cap and trade bills in the fall. In hasty response, cap and trade supporters 
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threw together a national public relations campaign. They plowed ahead toward what they hoped 
would be a bipartisan deal in the Senate. 
But one coalitional effort after another fell apart in late 2009 and early 2010, as putative 
Senate compromises came and went. In July 2010, Senate Leader Harry Reid finally pulled the plug 
when it became clear that no variant of cap and trade or any other kind of energy legislation had any 
prospect of coming close to the 60 votes needed to clear his chamber’s filibuster bar. During this 
pivotal year, Republicans, including long-time supposed friends of the environmental movement like 
John McCain, simply melted away; and in the end GOP Senators unanimously refused to support of 
any variant of cap and trade.  In public opinion polls, Americans registered increased wariness about 
government action on carbon caps – with public worries stoked by opponents claiming that new taxes 
and regulations would cost jobs, reduce family incomes, and stifle businesses struggling to recover 
from the Great Recession. 
Prospects for action on climate change soon deteriorated further.  In the November 2010 mid-
term elections Congressional Democrats sustained massive setbacks, and very conservative 
Republicans were in many instances replaced by right-wing extremists. The Republican-controlled 
House of Representatives that took office in January 2011 was one of the most right-wing in U.S. 
history, and it included dozens of Tea Party backed Republicans who would not bargain about any 
major Democratic legislative priority, certainly not carbon controls or green energy legislation.3  
Republican hardliners in and beyond Congress set out on a crusade to strip the federal Environmental 
Protection Agency of its judicially affirmed  powers to regulate greenhouse gases, and even to take 
away longstanding EPA powers in other areas of environmental protection. The Senate remained in 
Democratic hands by a small margin, but also saw an infusion of hard-right Republicans who would 
firmly oppose legislation and regulatory efforts to deal with global warming.  
The hardening opposition of the Republican Party on environmental issues remains as strong 
as ever headed into the 2014 and 2016 elections in the United States. 
To be sure, Republican presidential contender Mitt Romney lost the November 2012 
presidential election to Obama, and in the past year the Obama administration has advanced anti-
carbon regulations through administrative action in the Environmental Protection Agency.  But the 
House of Representatives remains firmly under the control of Republicans determined to block 
carbon-capping legislation and, if they can, limit or undo EPA regulations limiting carbon emissions. 
In U.S. governing arrangements, there are many levers for firm opponents of government action to 
sabotage or reverse policies they propose.  Until 2017 at least, and probably beyond, the United States 
is not going to be able to take legislatively grounded action to shift energy production and use across 
the national economy.  That means, in turn, that U.S. global leadership in the fight against global 
warming will remain much less effective than it needs to be, no matter what President Obama may say 
in international forums. 
Why did the resounding defeat of cap and trade legislation happen?  And why was that defeat 
accompanied by a fierce right-wing mobilization against any effective U.S. government action to limit 
carbon emissions?    The answers to these questions take us into the details of U.S. politics and the 
evolution of the American environmental movement, maybe into too much detail for many non-
Americans.  But the story of U.S. right-wing mobilization against climate science and efforts to reduce 
carbon emissions is a fascinating – and it is a story that has implications for the entire world, not just 
for Americans. 
 
What cap and trade supporters tried to do 
Long before President Barack Obama and Congressional Democrats took office in 2009, proponents 
of curbing carbon emissions in the U.S. economy worked to lay the basis for market-accommodating 
policy frameworks and forge coalitions between environmental groups and certain business interests to 
back such legislation. When an apparent opening came in 2009, supporters of cap and trade were 
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ready to mount lobbying efforts focused especially inside Washington DC to get most Democrats and 
some Republicans in Congress to pass their preferred “cap and trade” legislation.4 
 
Reorientations in U.S. Environmentalism 
The decades of the 1990s and 2000s brought controversy and realignment in the U.S. environmental 
movement, whose primal legislative victories had been scored decades earlier, when landmark laws 
like the Clean Air Act of 1970, the Clean Water Act of 1972, and the Endangered Special Act of 1973 
were put on the books. Once those laws and federal regulatory bureaucracies to enforce them were in 
place, the DC political opportunity structure shifted – and so did the organization and focus of 
environmental activism. Big environmental organizations headquartered in Washington DC and New 
York expanded their professional staffs and became very adept at preparing scientific reports and 
commentaries to urge the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) onward. They also filed lawsuits 
when necessary, and lobbied Congressional staffers who were frequently open to improving 
regulations about clean air and water.   
By the 1990s, global warming was recognized among environmentalists as a threat to the 
environment very different from traditional kinds of air and water pollution. Although the EPA is not 
optimally organized to cope with such an overarching issue for the national economy, most 
professional environmentalists initially envisaged responding to climate change by supplementing 
EPA authority to regulate particular types of dangerous emissions. Gradually, however, a new strain of 
market-friendly environmentalism gained ground.5  Not long after he took over, at age 30, as head of 
the faltering Environmental Defense Fund, Fred Krupp launched a bold strategy to place less emphasis 
on lawsuits and regulatory enactments and instead pursue environmental goals through “strange 
bedfellows” coalitions between environmental experts and particular business leaders.6  Krupp made a 
splash – and sparked acrimonious debates among environmentalists, too – with a November 20, 1986 
Wall Street Journal editorial called “New Environmentalism Factors in Economic Needs.”7  
Pioneering U.S. environmentalists, Krupp explained, sought to conserve resources and beautiful 
enclaves like Yosemite; and the second-phasers took over in the 1960s and 1970s, looking to punish 
and regulate polluters. But now it was time for a less “relentlessly negative” third phase that would 
move beyond “reactive opposition” to industry to work with business and channel market forces, 
looking for ways to pursue at the same time environmental protection and the valid economic goals of 
furthering “growth, jobs, taxpayer and stockholder interests.”   
Not surprisingly, Krupp’s approach at EDF caught the attention of advisors to Republican 
President George Bush, Sr., who would soon be looking for a way to deliver on campaign promises to 
fight the “acid rain” (caused by sulfur dioxide emissions from Midwestern power plants) that was 
harming northeastern lakes and forests.  Many in the broad environmental community looked askance 
when Krupp later teamed up with electric company executive Jim Rogers and with the Bush White 
House to back an emissions trading system to reduce the pollutants causing acid rain.  Before long, 
Congress installed this experiment in the 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act, and the new 
approach soon proved itself. At a lower than expected cost, acid-rain causing emissions were 
ultimately reduced far below initial projections. 
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The acid rain success launched an enticing policy model. Thereafter, emissions trading under 
a cap rapidly gained new acceptance among professional environmentalists – on its way to becoming 
“the holy grail of environmental policymaking.”8 The first applications were in regional compacts 
among state governments in the Northeast and Northwest, followed by adoption of a kind of carbon 
capping and trading system by the European Union. Such early experiments with cap and trade 
programs fed back into ongoing intellectual debates about how best to adapt this approach to the 
overarching challenge of reducing greenhouse gas emissions in the fight against global warming. “Cap 
and trade” became the favored approach for moderate environmentalists and the apparent key to 
forging alliances with some business leaders to push legislation that could gain Republican as well as 
Democratic votes in Congress.   
As ideas moved toward actual legislation, momentum built behind market-accommodating 
approaches to setting a carbon cap for the U.S. economy. Key environmentalists kept reaching out to 
business and moderate Republicans, and managed to persuade teams of Senators to introduce cap and 
trade styled bills and bring them to votes in 2003, 2005, and 2008.  Although vote margins did not 
improve, cap and trade proponents remained optimistic, because the November 2008 elections seemed 
likely to strengthen their hand.  
 
Forging the USCAP Coalition of Environmentalists and Business 
From 2006 on, cap and trade proponents were also creating and working within the U.S. Climate 
Action Partnership, which was publicly announced in January 2007.  USCAP brought together more 
than two dozen big business CEOs with the leaders of big environmental organizations – the 
Environmental Defense Fund, the National Resources Defense Council, the Pew Center on Global 
Climate Change, the World Resources Institute, and the Nature Conservancy. (Originally, the National 
Wildlife Federation was also on board, but it eventually dropped out in early 2009.)  The rules of the 
game for principals joining USCAP required major corporate and environmental organizations to pay 
annual dues of $100,000 and also lend their CEOs to an arduous and protracted bargaining process.9 
That process sought to move the strange bedfellows in this stakeholder coalition from general 
principles to detailed legislative proposals. Organizational leaders and their staffs had to settle 
contentious specifics such as goals and timetables for greenhouse gas reductions and allocations of 
pollution allowances to specific industrial sectors.  The back and forth, the blowups, the last-minute 
concessions – all the colorful details fill many pages in Eric Pooley’s book The Climate War.  
USCAP was an inherently asymmetrical coalition, due to the very different modus operandi of 
business organizations versus nonprofit advocacy groups – and the greater investment of 
environmental groups in achieving cap and trade legislation of some sort. When one side in an alliance 
has fewer options for maneuver, and also needs a bargain to succeed more than the other, the needy, 
inflexible side will surely give more, and do so again and again. The corporations that participated in 
USCAP could double their bottom-line bets – by participating in the strange-bedfellows effort to 
hammer out draft climate legislation that was as favorable as possible to their industry or their firms, 
and at the same time participating in business associations likely to lobby against much or all of the 
terms of that insider bargain once it faced Congress or the general public. As they should do given 
their role as heads of profit-maximizing businesses, the corporate CEOs in USCAP – such as Jim 
Rogers of Duke Energy – could work in more than one way to protect their firms’ bottom lines.  But 
heads of the Environmental Defense Fund, the National Resources Defense Council, and the other the 
leading environmental organizations in USCAP had to stick by whatever commitments they made in 
the internal coalitional process, or else it would fall apart. How could Fred Krupp of EDF possibly 
allow a collapse in these negotiations, given that his entire career was premised on the notion that 
neoliberal bargains with business are the key to saving the environment? Not surprisingly, the major 
environmental groups that stuck with USCAP throughout 2009 and 2010 repeatedly gave ground on 
issues like free allowances and offsets to carbon polluters. They steadily lost leverage, because they 
could not simultaneously stand up for negotiated compromises with their business partners in USCAP 
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and have their own organizations push unremittingly for tougher, more environmentally friendly 
legislative provisions. Leaders like EDF’s Krupp and Frances Beinecke from the Natural Resources 
Defense Council necessarily placed all their chips on cooperation with some industrial sectors and 
business chieftains, and had to hope that those business leaders could push Congress to act by 
convincing key legislators that not all businesses were opposed to cap and trade legislation. When 
encouragement from USCAP businesses proved to be far from enough in the Senate, the USCAP 
environmental groups had no other real arrows in their quivers. And since they were pretty much the 
entire ball game for carbon capping legislation, they had no nationwide network of popularly rooted 
advocacy and community groups and unions comparable to the network that pushed for health reform 
to pass Congress in 2010.  
But is it fair to say that all the chips for carbon capping were placed on USCAP alone?  After 
all, before and after 2008 major foundations and individual wealthy donors not only supported 
USCAP; they also invested millions of dollars in public “messaging” and mobilization campaigns. 
Funded at about $80-$100 million annually, Al Gore’s organization, the Alliance for Climate 
Protection, was active starting in 2006, from the time of his big movie release and subsequent 
celebrity. The Alliance claimed field organizers in more than two dozen states, and it enrolled citizen 
activists and ran nonpartisan paid media advertising campaigns aiming (in the organization’s words) 
“to persuade the American people… of the … urgency of adopting and implementing effective and 
comprehensive solutions for the climate crisis.”10 More pertinent to the cap and trade battle itself, 
another public messaging effort, dubbed Clean Energy Works, was launched in the summer of 2009, 
right after the House passed the Waxman-Markey bill. Led by a Paul Tewes, a renowned former field 
organizer for the Obama campaign, the Clean Energy Works campaign reportedly deployed about 200 
field organizers in 28 Midwestern, western, and southern states, and spent about $50 million on mass 
advertising during the Senate deliberations of 2009-10, pushing the general message that action to 
combat climate change would lead to “Better Jobs, Less Pollution, and More Security.”11  Tens of 
millions more were spent on cap and trade-related public messaging by various other donors and green 
groups. 
Overall, the new organizational investments for the cap and trade push could be described as 
furthering a clear political division of labor. Supported by experts, the insider stakeholders in USCAP 
would bargain out the details of actual legislation, while the pollsters, ad-writers, and field operatives 
in the messaging campaigns would try to persuade enough Americans to be generally supportive to 
open space for legislators in Congress to act.  The messaging campaigns would not make it their 
business to actually shape legislation – or even talk about details with ordinary citizens or grass roots 
groups. Ordinary American citizens and street-level activists were not presumed to have an interest in 
or a need to know about the “how” of anti-warming legislation; they were just supposed to be 
persuaded to endorse the general principle of a legislative solution to a pressing problem. 
Both Gore’s Alliance and Tewes’s Clean Energy Works claimed to have airlifted state 
organizers into dozens of swing states to work on media-events at crucial legislative junctures. Yet 
most of their tens of millions of dollars in messaging resources went into mass persuasion 
advertisements, especially on television. But the ads were not very effective. They rarely identified 
heroes or enemies in specific ways – beyond tentatively criticizing generalized “polluters” – and they 
maintained a lofty nonpartisan stance well above the level of any policy specifics, offering very 
general calls for Americans to act together to address sketchily defined problems caused by climate 
change. Presumably, the climate-change ads were meant to get citizens to register more “concern” 
about global warming, which in turn would supposedly make it easier for legislators to support cap 
and trade. But the ads had little to say to ordinary Americans about how cap and trade legislation 
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would protect them from cost increases or help their families deal with pressing concerns in a 
deepening national economic downturn.   
Not surprisingly, the opponents of carbon-capping had much more concrete things to say to 
voters. In their opulently funded advertising and astroturf organizing campaigns, the opponents 
demonized pending legislation as “cap and tax” and proclaimed that, if the nefarious measures DC 
insiders were cooking up actually passed Congress, each family would have to spend up to $3,100 
more per year for gas and electricity.12 Opponents of carbon capping also painted lurid details about 
how regulations would hurt business profits and discourage “job creators.” The opponents did a better 
job of scaring citizens than the proponents did of arousing enthusiasm for whatever it was they were 
trying to get through Congress. As cap and trade supporters in the Senate were making last-gasp 
efforts to rejigger proposals and assemble votes, the American public registered waning support for 
action and lack of comprehension of what was at issue.  The scare-ads of opponents surely had an 
effect, and the incomprehension was nothing new. Back in May 2009, just before the House acted on 
Waxman-Markey, only 24% of respondents to a national poll told Rasmussen that they understood 
what “cap and trade” meant.13   
 During the winter and spring of 2010, the insider, USCAP fuelled effort to get a bipartisan set 
of Senators to support cap and trade legislation that could be melded with the 2009 House bill reached 
a point of dwindling returns, yet there was no popularly rooted coalition in place to push on Congress 
from the outside. When the April 20, 2010 explosion of the British Petroleum oil rig in the Gulf of 
Mexico made it harder to work out legislative bargains that included some pay-offs for oil-state 
Senators, there was no national citizen’s movement to keep pushing – either for a variant of cap and 
trade or for some alternative legislation addressing carbon emissions. Inside the Senate, there were a 
couple of alternative bills put forward, including a proposal to regulate electric utilities and a bill to tax 
carbon energy and give the money back to individual citizens in the form of annual “dividends” that 
would help families defray rising energy costs.  But both of these alternatives were tardy efforts with 
no real DC coalitions or national mobilizations behind them. Proponents of carbon caps were unable to 
force a final Senate vote on any legislative approach at all – and the Democratic-led House was left 
hanging with the controversial measure it pushed over the top in the spring of 2009. For carbon-
capping efforts during the early Obama presidency, the end came in a prolonged series of whimpers 
and cop-outs, as it became clear not only that no Republican Senators would support action, but also 
that many Democrats saw no point in carrying the issue further.     
 
Outflanked by extremists 
Beyond the story of how an insider lobbying effort to pass cap and trade legislation fell short in 2010, 
we need to wonder why the USCAP plan was launched in the first place.  In retrospect, the political 
terrain on which carbon-capping reformers were maneuvering in 2009 and 2010 was fatefully 
treacherous well before USCAP issued its legislative blueprint at the start of the Obama presidency.  
At the moment of Obama’s election, participants in the USCAP effort, along with their supporters in 
the broad environmental community, sincerely believed the DC stars were aligned for legislation to 
proceed; and they also trusted that the general American public would accept the need for action to 
combat climate change. Many of them understood that successful legislation would be watered down 
and compromised in the Congressional sausage-making process; but they had faith they could make a 
start at regulating the price of carbon in the U.S. economy, which would in turn enable the United 
States to join as a credible partner in world-wide agreements. However, if we step back and look at 
long- and medium-term developments in party orientations and public views prior to the 2008 
elections, we can see that gaping crevasses had opened in the slippery slopes the carbon-cappers were 
trying to climb.  The funders, experts, professional environmentalists, and cooperative business leaders 
who labored during the 2000s to prepare the way for a legislative push for cap and trade when a 
friendly president and Congress took office were not noticing the overall shifts in American politics 
that would make their insider-bargaining effort virtually impossible to pull off.  
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Let’s start by dissecting long-term trends in Congress and public opinion.  Modern U.S. 
environmentalism took shape in the 1960s and 1970s, when Americans gained new awareness of 
pollution as a threat to such life-sustaining basics as air and water.14 Some twenty million Americans 
took part in pro-environmental events for Earth Day in 1970, and sustained citizen concern allowed 
the launch of the protective efforts chartered by the Clean Air Act of 1970, the Clean Water Act of 
1972, and the Endangered Species Act of 1973. After the Environmental Protection Agency was set up 
in 1970, advocacy organizations built up professional staffs of lawyers, lobbyists, and scientific 
experts to spur and shape federal policy. During the Reagan years in the 1980s, business interests 
pushed back and tried to weaken or reverse federal environmental rules, but general public sympathy 
with environmentalism remained strong and a number of major advocacy organizations attracted new 
contributors and mailing-list adherents as they successfully defended the EPA and the basic edifice of 
federal environmental laws. 
 
 
 
Starting in 1973 and continuing regularly through 2006, the Gallup survey organization asked national 
samples of adults whether U.S. spending to “protect the environment” was “too much,” “too little,” or 
“about right.”15  Unfortunately, other survey questions about environmental views have not been asked 
repeatedly over a comparably long stretch. Yet the long-running Gallup question is not bad for getting 
at partisan breakdowns, because Republicans and Democrats, conservatives and liberals, are known to 
take different positions on the general desirability of public spending.  Figure 1 shows the year by year 
Gallup results, revealing that over several decades Americans were quite amenable to spending for 
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Figure 1. Congressional Pro-Environment Scores and 
Citizen Support for Increased Environmental Spending
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environmental protection, with majorities or near-majorities of both self-identified Republicans and 
self-identified Democrats opining that “too little” was being spent. This was true even in the 1980s 
when the Reagan-led Republican Party was trying to roll back many environmental regulations.  
During the GOP presidency of George Bush, Sr. from 1988 to 1992, citizens of both party persuasions 
showed very strong support for spending on environmental protection. 
Thereafter popular opinion began to diverge more sharply along partisan lines, as Republican 
identifiers, especially, became much less likely to say too little was being spent on environmental 
protection. Partisan opinion gaps of ten to fifteen percentage points persisted from the mid-1990s 
through the end of the Gallup series in 2006.  But even in this era of clear partisan differentiation in 
citizen support for environmental spending, two realities are worth emphasis. Partisan differences in 
public opinion remained very small compared to steadily growing partisan splits in Congressional 
voting about environmental policies; and public views evolved in closer relationship to the pro-
environmental positions taken by Democrats in Congress than to the increasingly all-out oppositional 
voting of Congressional Republicans.16   
The principal measure I use to track elite partisan positions comes from scores assigned by the 
League of Conservation Voters to elected legislators in the House and Senate. Legislators stand at the 
intersection of public opinion and interest-group pressures; they need support from ordinary voters, 
but they also solicit donations and receive a steady flow of policy messages from wealthy supporters, 
economic interest groups, and ideologically inspired advocacy groups. We can presume that legislators 
are quite sensitive to what partisan elites around them are demanding, yet they do have to win votes, 
too. Taking both voter preferences and demands from advocates and funders into account, legislators 
vote on a steady flow of bills and amendments that push policy in one direction or another. It is 
valuable to have a consistent way to track these votes, and that is what the League of Conservation 
voters provides in the environmental policy arena. Each year since its founding in 1970, the League 
has assembled leading environmentalists to designate important bills and amendments and decide what 
counts as a “pro-environmental” vote on each. The positions taken by each Senator and member of the 
House of Representatives are tallied and an average score assigned to that legislator.  From the 
legislators’ scores, it is possible to derive average LCV voting scores for state delegations, entire 
regions, and party delegations in each chamber. For many years the League issued “National 
Environmental Scorecard” reports that included summary scores for Republicans and Democrats in the 
House and Senate respectively – although, interestingly enough, it abruptly stopped publishing 
summary party scores after 2004, with no explanation offered.  Nevertheless, the subsequent raw 
scores can still be averaged in the traditional way to create a consistent series for each party in the 
House and Senate from 1970 through 2011; and it is also possible to average the House and Senate 
party scores to come up with an overall party Congressional average for each year, as I have done.  In 
some charts, I use the positive LCV score (where a score of 100 designates the maximum possible 
pattern of voting in accord with League priorities and zero designates total opposition), while in others 
I present anti-environmental voting scores (derived by subtracting LCV scores from 100).  
 A mere glance at trends in the LCV scores displayed in Figure 1 makes it clear that 
Congressional partisan polarization on environmental priorities is deep and longstanding.  Splits 
between Democratic and GOP legislators started much sooner and were always greater than partisan 
differences in public opinion, no doubt because politicians in the two parties were responding to 
different interests and ideas among funders and interest group leaders. Business interests had more 
sway with Republicans, while environmental reformers had easier access to Democrats. Nevertheless, 
Congressional partisan divisions were not extreme during the 1970s and 1980s, and the partisan gap 
did not grow significantly during that early era. The 24-point difference between the party averages in 
1970 was not all that different from the 29-point difference in 1990, despite big shifts in public issue 
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agendas and presidential priorities. During modern U.S. environmentalism’s earliest decades, 
Americans regardless of party tended to support spending on environmental protection, and business 
interests adjusted to new environmental guidelines as time went by. Broadly in tune with public 
sentiments, Democrats in Congress tended to support LCV priorities half to two-thirds of the time, 
while Congressional GOPers – who were more cross-pressured by business interests reluctant to 
accept environmental regulations – nevertheless supported the same LCV priorities thirty to forty 
percent of the time.  
But after 1990 the modest partisan gap in Congress quickly splayed into a veritable chasm. By 
the year 2000, the Congressional partisan divide had more than doubled, from 29 points on the LCV 
scale in 1990 to an extraordinary 63.5 points a decade later. The divide widened even further over the 
next ten years, reaching an amazing 73.5 points by 2010.  Pictures cannot tell us everything (which is 
why polarization researchers favor complicated regression equations), but Figure 1 makes it obvious 
that voter sentiment did not drive Congressional partisan splits.  Between the early 1990s and the early 
2000s, public opinion did not polarize anywhere near as much as Congressional voting did. Responses 
to the long-running Gallup question about “too little” environmental spending showed a larger partisan 
split in this period than they had earlier, but ordinary citizens hugged two sides of the middle ground 
and did not part company with one another on partisan lines to the same extreme as their elected 
representatives. After 1990, especially, Republicans in Congress swung quickly toward extreme 
opposition to environmental priorities. 
 
Climate Change Denial 
Scholars who have looked at the sharp rightward shift by Republicans point to the impact of pressures 
from carbon-intensive industries and ultra-free-market ideological groups.  Republicans had long been 
responsive to business lobbies, and U.S. business groups became more coordinated and effective at 
blocking regulations and pressing for reduced taxes during the 1980s and 1990s.17  Anti-tax groups 
such as Grover Norquist’s Americans for Tax Reform and the plutocrat-funded Club for Growth 
mobilized to press Republican officeholders and candidates against raising taxes, ever, for any 
reason.18  Instead of worrying about balancing budgets, GOP officials began to push tax cuts and 
reductions in domestic spending as the solution to all governing problems; and in the political arena 
the pragmatic conservatism of Ronald Reagan gave way to the bomb-throwing variety of Newt 
Gingrich. From the mid-1990s on, Republicans in Congress came to see bargaining and compromise 
with Democrats as morally reprehensible – or, at least, as tickets to worrisome primary challenges 
from the right.    
Meanwhile, in the environmental arena specifically, conservative think tanks, well funded by 
carbon-industries, wealthy individuals, and ideologically conservative foundations, ramped up efforts 
to counter climate science findings and ridicule reformers who called for U.S. cooperation with 
international efforts to limit global warming.19  Anti-environmentalists learned lessons from what they 
saw as their own limited successes during the 1980s, when the leading environmental organizations 
had been able to mobilize public sympathy and question undue industry influence in the Reagan 
administration.  To fight new regulations about warming, conservatives felt they needed “insulation” 
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 On changes in business group lobbying capacities and goals, see Jacob S. Hacker and Paul Pierson, Winner-Take-All 
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 Binyamin Appelbaum, “How Party of Budget Restraint Shifted to `No New Taxes,’ Ever,” New York Times, December 22, 
2012; and  Sheldon D. Pollack, Refinancing America: The Republican Antitax Agenda (Albany, NY: State University of 
New York Press, 2003). 
19
 See the excellent discussion and documentation in Peter J. Jacques, Riley E. Dunlap, and Mark Freeman, “The 
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from overly visible ties to carbon industry groups. They also needed to “manufacture uncertainty” 
about the problem itself, not just oppose regulatory solutions.20  
International linkages also mattered. As social scientists Peter Jacques, Riley Dunlap, and 
Mark Freeman spell out, a pivotal event in the climate arena was the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio, which 
happened just as the Soviet Union broke up and thereby removed a longstanding international 
bogeyman conservatives had wielded against liberals.  With the “Red Menace” disappearing, 
conservatives “began to see global environmentalism as a threat to U.S. national sovereignty and 
economic power…,” a new international threat to which liberals were catering. Conservatives were 
determined to push back hard, not only by funding and lobbying Republicans in Congress, inspiring 
them to block environmental priorities and prevent the United States from ratifying international 
agreements, but also by fostering what these scholars call “environmental skepticism.”21  
Environmentalism, explain Jacques, Dunlap, and Freeman, is “unique among social movements in its 
heavy reliance on scientific evidence to support its claims,” so the most effective counter-tactic had to 
include questioning scientists and their findings.22   
But how were conservatives to accomplish this, given that university-based scholars were 
moving toward empirically grounded consensus about the threat of human-induced global warming?  
To get around academia, U.S. anti-environmentalists updated methods that had worked before in the 
fight against liberal welfare policies and in the fight to stave off regulation of tobacco as a carcinogen. 
They used non-profit, right-wing think tanks to sponsor and promote a cascade of books questioning 
the validity of climate science; and they pounced on occasional dissenters in the academic world, 
promoting them as beleaguered experts. A “counter-intelligentsia would be deployed to label 
mainstream academia as “leftist” and put forth a steady stream of books, reports, and policy briefs, not 
only to inform policymakers and their staffers directly, but also to induce media outlets to question the 
motives of reformer and present the science of climate change as, at best, controversial.  
According to sociologist Robert Brulle, many think tanks involved in sponsoring research and 
publications raising questions about the threat of global warming are long-standing general-purpose 
conservative organizations that received new funds to support projects challenging environmental 
science and regulatory proposals.23  In Brulle’s view, ideological funders and think thanks may have 
played an even stronger role than business interests in promoting climate-change denial, although it is 
often hard to tell who is funding what, because anonymous channels for directing money into politics 
have become more readily available in recent years. Brulle estimates that the total amount of money 
spent to raise questions about climate change and policies to deal with it has been considerably less 
over recent decades than the amounts spent in support of environmental efforts. “It’s the nature of the 
spending that makes the difference,” he explains. The environmental movement “actually tries to 
spend its money on developing solutions to climate change…. [T]hey spend hardly anything on 
political or cultural processes.” In contrast, the “climate change countermovement spends all of its 
money there.”24  That makes sense, according to Brulle, because the oppositional forces are trying to 
block policy changes, seeking to maintain the economic and political status quo that favors fossil fuel 
production, importation, and consumption.  
 To test the hypothesis that think tanks have been central to this broad political and cultural 
denial campaign – and to document that organized denial efforts ramped up sharply around 1990, just 
as global warming rose on the environmental agenda – Jacques, Dunlap, and Freeman compiled a list 
of 141 anti-environmental books published in English between 1972 and 2005, and then traced the 
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 The role of dissident scientists in various instances of “manufacturing doubt” is recounted in Naomi Oreskes and Erik M. 
Conway, Merchants of Doubt: How a Handful of Scientists Obscured the Truth on Issues from Tobacco Smoke to Global 
Warming (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2010). 
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 Ibid, pp. 349, 351. 
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 Ibid, p.353. 
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 See the interview “Robert Brulle: Inside the Climate Change ‘Countermovement’,” conducted on September 30, 2012, for 
the PBS Frontline documentary “Climate of Doubt.”  
24
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affiliations and organizational ties of their authors and sponsors, almost all of whom were U.S. based.  
The overwhelming preponderance, 130 of the 141 books, were either directly sponsored by 
conservative think tanks, or had authors tied to one or more think tanks. Eight are major organizations 
– such as the Competitive Enterprise Institute, the Institute for the Study of Economics and the 
Environment, and the Weidenbaum Center -- that have led the charge against climate science and do 
extensive lobbying against environmentalist-supported policies.   
 
 
As Figure 2 shows, the accumulated production of books and reports questioning environmentalism, 
including climate science, turned sharply upward in the 1990s, at the same time that GOP legislators 
lunged to the far right well in advance of the attitudes of ordinary Republican voters. Of course, the 
“Organization of Denial” study does not prove that the sharply rising cascade of anti-environmental 
books as such was the reason Republicans in Congress turned sharply right after 1990.  We do not 
have to assume that GOP Representatives, Senators, and their staffers were burning the midnight oil 
reading these often turgid tomes to recognize that these books and reports are indicators of a broader, 
sustained, and well-funded set of efforts to challenge climate-change reformers intellectually, as well 
as through bread-and-butter lobbying.  “Anti-environmentalists,” explain Jacques, Dunlap, and 
Freeman “learned that it was safer” and more politically effective to rely not only on economic 
lobbying, but to also “question the seriousness of environmental problems and portray 
environmentalists (and environmental scientists) as ‘radicals’ who distort evidence in order to 
exaggerate problems.”25  Produced with generous backing from wealthy foundations and corporations 
channeled through non-profit think tanks, the sponsored books complemented and amplified political 
contributions and massive DC lobbying efforts. In a steady drumbeat, the denial books and associated 
reports and briefs undermined the appearance of growing scientific consensus, especially because their 
hard-working authors penned OpEds and appeared regularly on television, influencing public opinion 
on the right. Republican candidates and officials no doubt had longstanding, practical reasons to listen 
to friendly business interests and oppose liberal environmentalists. But the intellectual challenges – 
and the deliberately stoked public doubts about scientific findings – gave them additional rationales 
for foot-dragging, as long as the science could be called “unsettled.”   
                                                     
25
 Ibid, p.361. 
Figure 2. Organized Climate Science Skepticism 
and the Growing Congressional Divide 
in Environmental Voting 
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The Pivotal Battle for U.S. Public Opinion in 2006 and 2007  
By the mid-2000s, opponents of carbon caps and other steps to reorient the U.S. economy to limit 
greenhouse gas emissions had to feel pretty good about where they stood – especially in the Congress 
of the United States, which would have to pass any legislation taxing carbon fuels or limiting 
greenhouse gas emissions. As Figure 3 shows, not only were Republican legislators taking 
oppositional votes on environmental priorities close to 90% of the time, members of the GOP 
leadership teams in the House and Senate were positioned still further to the right. In a number of 
years, their LCV scores averaged zero or close to it. 
True, strange bedfellow coalitions were gearing up to push for legislated emissions caps 
accompanied by schemes for trading permits. Conversations between some environmental honchos 
and some corporate CEOs started in 2004, paving the way for USCAP negotiations to get going in 
earnest during 2005 and 2006. More important, bipartisan teams of Senators introduced bills and 
managed to force votes on the floor of the Senate – as they did for the 2003 Lieberman-McCain 
Climate Stewardship Act and the 2005 McCain-Lieberman Climate Stewardship and Innovation Act. 
Arizona Republican Senator John McCain was a principal in these first two efforts, as he operated in 
full “maverick” mode following his challenge to George W. Bush in the 2000 GOP 
 
 
 
primaries and while he contemplated another run at the presidency from the center-right.  In this mid-
decade period, as indicated by his LCV scores displayed in Figure 3, McCain tacked toward the 
center, seeking to win sympathy and primary-election votes from moderate Republicans and 
Independents.  McCain’s moves included voting for more environmental priorities than most other 
Congressional Republicans and joining with his nominally Democratic buddy Joe Lieberman to 
bipartisan bills calling for emissions caps to deal with the threat of global warming. Still, neither of the 
two bills McCain co-sponsored with Lieberman got anywhere near the sixty votes they would have 
Figure 3. Pro-Environmental Voting in the U.S. Senate, 2000-2011
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needed to clear a GOP Senate filibuster; and when the second bill McCain-Lieberman bill came to a 
vote in 2005, it garnered fewer favorable votes (38) than did the Lieberman-McCain variant in 2003 
(which got 43 yes votes).  By 2007, moreover, McCain tacked hard right on environmental votes as he 
competed for the presidential nomination of a Republican Party in which conservatives were on the 
rise. At first, McCain’s allies at EDF and other environmental organizations might not have noticed – 
or maybe they just turned their eyes from the evidence – but their mavericky friend was on the way 
out the door. McCain’s LCV scores in 2007, 2008, and 2009 fell even lower than the very oppositional 
scores of the Republican Congressional leadership teams.   
 Even as McCain was exiting stage right, high-profile events raised the hopes of cap and trade 
proponents that the GOP legislative blockade could be breached. In January 2006, Hollywood gave a 
celebratory send-off to “An Inconvenient Truth,” Al Gore’s dramatic documentary about the 
catastrophic effects of global warming, which ran in theaters all over the country after its general 
release in April.  By the beginning of February 2007, Gore was co-nominated for the Nobel Peace 
Prize along with the U.N. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, just as the panel released its 
much-anticipated Fourth Report saying it is “unequivocal that the earth is getting warmer, and that 
greenhouse gases, produced in increasing quantities since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution, 
are very much to blame.”  Later in February, Gore stood “before an adulatory crowd” to accept an 
Academy Award for his movie.26 Coming in rapid succession, these events – along with expanding 
audiences for “An Inconvenient Truth” – caught public attention and increased Americans’ concern 
about global warming.   
 
 
 
The Gallup environment poll has repeatedly asked respondents whether various “environmental 
problems” “personally worry” them “a great deal, a fair amount, only a little, or not at all.”  In March 
2004, only 26% said the “greenhouse effect” or “global warming” worried them a great deal, but that 
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percentage increased to 36% in March 2006 and reached a peak of 41% in March 2007.  As with this 
Gallup question, most poll questions on climate change are asked only sporadically, and each survey 
organization uses its own wordings. This makes it virtually impossible to notice short-term shifts in 
public views. Recently, however, sociologists Robert Brulle, Jason Carmichael, and Craig Jenkins 
found a way around this problem, adapting a technique developed by political scientist James Stimson 
to measure shifts in public moods about public policy issues.27  By combining and calibrating data 
from all questions repeatedly asked by different polling organizations, the Brulle-Carmichael-Jenkins 
team has created a “Climate Change Threat Index” they can measure every three months from 2002 
through 2011.28 As Figure 4 shows, their data show a big spike in the index between mid-2005 and 
mid-2007, indicating that the American public did indeed become more concerned during the period 
when the Gore movie was widely shown and the findings in the Fourth Assessment Report of IPCC 
got major play in the media.  
Brulle, Carmichael, and Jenkins do not have breakdowns on their index for Republicans 
versus Democrats, but partisan trends are available from Gallup, Pew, and other polling organizations 
that asked pertinent questions in the mid-2000s. Detailed trends for partisan subgroups show that, for a 
time, public concern rose across the board. Respondents who called themselves Republicans always 
registered less concern than Independents and Democrats, but their views moved in the same direction 
as overall U.S. opinion reached a peak of concern with global warming and its baleful effects in mid-
2007.   This is not entirely surprising. As we saw in our previous consideration of long-term trends, 
public opinion on environmentalism was never as divided along partisan lines as members of Congress 
were in their voting on environmental issues. As late as the mid-2000s, therefore, the possibility 
remained that most Americans – including a clear plurality if not a bare majority of Republicans – 
could converge on the view that global warming is very threatening and government must act to 
address greenhouse gas emissions.  
As the Gore movie gained public praise and its message spread, opponents of government 
action to remediate global warming surely realized that their hold on Republican legislators could 
weaken if anything remotely resembling a new public consensus took hold.  If Republican voters 
became more supportive of action against climate change, additional defectors like McCain – in his 
2003-05 “maverick” incarnation – might emerge from Republican ranks. Such a development would 
give a clear boost to the CEOs and environmental leaders working on the strange-bedfellows USCAP 
“Blueprint” for cap and trade legislation, because the chances would improve for peeling off a few 
Congressional Republicans to vote with most Democrats for a nominally bipartisan compromise.  
 Opponents wasted no time in going to war to cut off this possibility – and in retrospect it looks 
as if they moved so quickly that the USCAP members never understood the shifts in conservative 
popular opinion that followed. From the Brulle-Carmichael-Jenkins tracking of the Climate Change 
Index displayed in Figure 4, we see that public concern plunged soon after it reached the mid-2007 
highpoint; and the decline continued through the presidential election year of 2008.  These scholars 
have done sophisticated statistical tests of various hypotheses to probe what may have caused all of the 
ups and downs in public concern over the 2002 to 2010 period.   Did the public react to severe weather 
events, to coverage of scientific findings?  How did economic ups and downs, and the realities of U.S. 
casualties in foreign wars, interact with media coverage and political debates about global warming?   
And what about high-profile events like the Gore movie or Hurricane Katrina?   
When all is said and done, Brulle, Carmichael, and Jenkins conclude that adverse economic 
trends and rising war casualties had modest effects in dampening public concern with climate change. 
Severe weather events and science news did not have any significant impact.  Tellingly, partisan 
debates were the biggest drivers of the ups and downs in public concern.  As many political scientists 
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have argued, voters not only press their views on elected officials; they also take cues from those 
officials.29 Throughout the 2000s decade, Brulle, Carmichael, and Jenkins show, GOP Congressional 
votes and arguments against environmental bills were associated with declining public concern, while 
statements from Democratic politicians about the rising threat of global warming and the need to deal 
with it raised the level of public concern. Remember, these findings come from quarterly 
measurements of both dependent and independent variables, so the findings are unusually powerful.  
Brulle, Carmichael, and Jenkins do not find an independent effect from media coverage, but 
they believe that partisan statements had their effects when disseminated through the media.  To 
dissect in more detail what was happening in the crucial 2006 and 2007 period – when public concern 
with the climate threat first grew sharply, and then turned sharply downward leading into the 2008 
presidential election year – we need data that breaks down opinion trends for Republican and 
Democratic-identified respondents and also probes the actual content of media messages. Additional 
polling data and a path breaking new study of media narratives by political scientist Frederick W. 
Mayer take us further toward filling in the blanks about partisan opinion trends.   
Mayer’s work on “Stories of Climate Change: Competing Narratives, the Media, and U.S. 
Public Opinion 2001-2010” recognizes that public opinion, especially on relatively abstract issues 
such as global warming, is influenced not so much by mere factual renditions as by the stories people 
see dramatized on television.30  Surveying coverage of global warming by the three mainstream 
networks, NBC, CBS, and ABC, as well as coverage by the cable networks CNN, Fox, and MSNBC, 
Mayer developed a typology of six narrative story-lines and measured how often each type appeared 
in television coverage of climate-change issues on each outlet.  Climate Tragedy stories resemble the 
message of Al Gore’s movie: scientists and environmental reformers are the heroes, because they do 
studies that reveal the growing existential threat to the planet and urge us to action to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions before it is too late.  But other media narratives either muddy the waters or 
refute the Climate Tragedy storyline.  Hoax stories suggest that climate scientists are wrong or corrupt, 
trying to push radical government regulations with false science; Don’t Kill the Goose stories stress 
that regulations pushed by climate-change warriors will do more harm than good, hurting the economy 
and the American way of life; and He Said, She Said stories stress that climate science findings are 
uncertain or disputed, and it is too early to take governmental action based on shaky science. Policy 
Game stories also stress conflict about global warming remedies, in this case by narrating the political 
“horse race” and often offering “a downward arc with a dark meaning, in that they chronicle the 
futility of policy processes.”31 A final type of story, dubbed by Mayer The Denialist Conspiracy, 
highlights corporate-funded efforts to deny the validity of climate science and mislead the public into 
ignoring threats from global warming.   
Although both Climate Tragedy and Denialist narratives can be considered pro-environmental 
and favorable to legislation to deal with global warming, only the Climate Tragedy type presents a 
straightforward narrative of consensual scientific findings.  All of the other types, even the Denialist 
type, introduce the viewer to the notion that climate change science and politics is full of conflict and 
uncertainty.  What I have done with Mayer’s data is concentrate on the sum total of all types of stories 
except his “Climate Tragedy” type, in order to look at trends in media stories that either present global 
warming as a hoax or stress controversies about threats from climate change and what might be done 
to counter them32  
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Climate change television segments did not become frequent until the middle of the decade; and 
Mayer shows that the classic networks (NBC, CBS, and ABC) followed similar patterns, so looking at 
ABC is good enough to capture their “mainstream” coverage.  I set aside CNN, because Mayer shows 
that this cable network was divided and back and forth in coverage, sometimes echoing mainstream 
networks’ patterns, sometimes Fox patterns.  We can assume that viewers of CNN got thoroughly 
mixed messages about whether climate science is valid. Fox network coverage is the most important to 
track, because much evidence on television viewership habits today shows that Fox’s older, white, 
conservative-minded audience overlaps closely with self-reported “Republicans” and conservatives.33 
Many of those citizens are loyal only to Fox and to other overtly conservative radio and Internet 
outlets.34  Conservative-minded Americans often get the entirety of their news information from 
watching Fox for hours a day, or listening to right-wing radio hosts who echo the same story lines.    
Figure 5 displays trends in the types of stories Fox and ABC broadcast about climate change 
along with partisan breakdowns in answers to key questions about climate skepticism posed repeatedly 
in polls by Gallup and the Pew Center on the People and the Press.  Fox broadcast fewer that a dozen 
climate-change stories of any kind in the years 2002, 2003, and 2004 respectively; but its coverage 
rose thereafter (from 37 stories in 2005, to 39 in 2006, and 190 in 2007).  On ABC, coverage was also 
sparse in 2002-04 and increased thereafter. All television outlets broadcast fewer stories in 2008 – it 
was an election year, and in a sense the primary and general-election candidates disseminated the key 
messages that year – and then resumed coverage of climate issues in 2009 and 2010 during the cap and 
trade debates in Congress and the run-up to the Copenhagen summit. 
We can turn to Pew and Gallup for repeated polls measuring climate skepticism in partisan 
segments of the public.  Pew regularly asked national samples the question “From what you have read 
and heard, is there solid evidence that the average temperature on earth has been getting warmer over 
the past decades, or not?” And Gallup repeatedly asked “Thinking about what is said in the news, in 
your view is the seriousness of global warming – generally exaggerated, generally correct, or is it 
generally underestimated?” Figure 5 is oriented so that higher percentages represent answers 
expressing skepticism about climate science and the threat of global warming.  From the data it is clear 
that skepticism rose sharply from 2006 to 2007 or 2008, especially among Republicans compared to 
Democrats.  Figure 5 also maps trends in the percentage of all Fox and ABC climate-change stories 
that either stressed the Hoax story line or in some way portrayed conflict or uncertainty among 
scientists and policymakers about climate change issues.   
Media research often suffers from the difficulty that we cannot pin down whether outlets 
shape or merely echo shifting public beliefs.  Yet for the 2007 turnabouts in public views about the 
threat of climate change, Mayer’s research strongly suggests that deliberate decisions by television 
executives may have been involved – especially in pushing skepticism among conservative-minded 
Americans who very loyal to Fox and like-minded media outlets.  In a fascinating part of his research, 
Mayer looks in day-by-day detail at coverage in the month of February 2007, when critical events 
coalesced – as the Nobel Prize nomination for Al Gore and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change was announced, the alarming findings of the panel’s Fourth Assessment Report received 
blanket coverage, and “An Inconvenient Truth” won two Oscar prizes.   
The ABC network, as Mayer recounts, pursued an unadulterated story line, typical of 
mainstream media, presenting the IPCC report as “a unique example of science in the service of 
society” with findings that are “definitive” and “frightening” on the reality of global warming. “No 
longer any question that the Earth is warming,” declared an ABC reporter in a typical segment that 
month. “The warming is due to greenhouse gases and …those gasses are produced by us.”35  But Fox 
made a sharp pivot the same month, toward presenting the IPCC and climate scientists as pushing a 
hoax, and ridiculing Al Gore and other reformers as hypocritical radicals. Fox’s earliest February 
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coverage of the IPCC report, during an evening segment on February 2, was straightforwardly 
descriptive, according to Mayer’s meticulous review of transcripts. But “it was to be the last such 
report in Fox.” Starting that very same evening, and unfolding in a rising crescendo in following days  
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and months, Fox stressed the theme of climate science hoaxes and radical environmentalists attacking 
the American way of life in pursuit of long-standing “leftist” agendas, delivering a steady diet of 
messages such as these: 
 
 February 2, with dissenting scientists featured: “Some scientists say the summary of the U.N. 
climate change report, we told you about earlier, distorts the actual scientific findings, because 
of a political agenda.”  
 
 February 5, conservative commentator featured: “Well I think this isn’t science any more, I 
think this has become effectively a kind of religion of the left…. You know the religious right 
gets mocked when it says America is going to pieces because of lap dancing and gay marriage 
and what not. Well this so-called religious left if you like, why is it any less ridiculous when 
they say America is going to pieces because we’re driving Chevy Suburbans and eating cheese 
burgers. There’s simply no evidence for that.” 
 
 February 7, 6pm, featuring spokesman from the Competitive Enterprise Institute (a major 
denier-promoting think tank): “This is Gore being Gore, a member of the intolerant left 
manifesting… the very clear philosophy of the global warming alarmist movement.” 
 
 February 7, 8pm, O’Reilly Show, featuring a dissenting Virginia professor: “The IPCC report 
is overhyped. Look, this new U.N. report comes out, and it says human beings are warming – 
warming the surface temperatures. To me that’s like a breathless announcement that there’s 
gambling in Las Vegas.”       
 
 February 7, 9:30pm on Hannity and Colmes, a lopsided half-hour debate introduced with the 
bottom-line theme: “In spite of the recent cold weather across the nation, hysteria over global 
warming is not letting up. Al Gore continuing to push the environmental agenda.” 
 
Going forward, explains Mayer, “Fox would tell a consistently negative narrative about climate 
change and the science behind it,” occasionally interrupting this story line with episodes touting 
conflict over climate science.36 
It is hard to avoid the conclusion that popular climate-change denial was deliberately stoked 
from above. The orchestration of doubt had been going on for many years, as indicated by the cascade 
of denialist books from the late 1980s documented earlier in Figure 3.  Yet at the critical juncture in 
2007 – when Americans in general might have been persuaded of the urgency of dealing with global 
warming – Fox television went all-in at telling stories about “hoax” climate science and ridiculing 
climate experts and reformers as “religious” adherents pushing a radical-left agenda that would hobble 
the American way of life.  
Of course, Fox is never alone in spreading messages such as the “hoax” claims about climate 
science.  Mainstream networks also conveyed such stories when they played up controversies.  What 
is more, Fox has a central role in an interconnected web of conservative media outlets that repeat and 
amplify story lines designed to challenge non-conservatives.37  Rush Limbaugh’s nationally 
syndicated radio program is a hugely important megaphone, reaching tens of millions listeners of 
listeners for hours every day in their homes, cars, trucks, and work-sites.38 Each local area in the 
United States likewise has its own popular right-wing talk radio host, who chews over the themes 
featured on Fox and discussed by Limbaugh. Right-wing bloggers are active, too, and grassroots 
conservatives often spend hours a day emailing political rumors, accusations, and arguments to a wide 
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network of friends and relatives.39 The entire conservative media “echo chamber,” as it has been aptly 
dubbed, can very quickly hammer home a claim, however factually unfounded, spreading it not only 
to millions of conservative-minded people, but also to other media outlets that routinely take up 
controversies and thus spread misleading ideas to yet more viewers or listeners.40   
Mayer’s evidence about the rapid increase in Fox coverage of climate hoax stories should, 
therefore, be taken as indicative of a much broader, concerted messaging campaign – which almost 
certainly reached and influenced millions of Americans who identify as “Republican” or 
“conservative.” Climate denial got disseminated deliberately and rapidly from think tank tomes to the 
daily media fare of about thirty to forty percent of the U.S. populace. As Figure 5 shows, available 
opinion evidence suggests that deliberate efforts to spread climate change denial were quite successful, 
especially among self-identified rank-and-file Republicans.  In a lurid drumbeat, ordinary 
conservative-minded Americans watched and heard messages denying the validity of climate science 
and the reality of human-induced global warming – and those citizens were the ones who turned most 
sharply toward expressing skepticism in national polls in 2007 and beyond.  No doubt, right-wing 
advocates waved the poll results in front of GOP legislators; and perhaps even more important, the 
stoking of popular climate-change denial shaped the terrain for the 2007-08 GOP primary season.  
Notably, the spike in climate-change denial among conservatives took effect months before the 
general 2008 presidential contest and the launch of the Obama presidency in January 2009. 
As evidence for the bipartisan potential of cap and trade in 2009, reformers pointed to a few 
statements by presidential contender John McCain that acknowledged the climate change threat and 
espoused general support for market-friendly caps on greenhouse gas emissions.41  Both 2008 
presidential candidates, cap and trade reformers say, acknowledged climate change and pointed toward 
a USCAP-style solution.  But such rosy views cherry-pick the evidence as it stood on the eve of the 
cap and trade push. McCain’s scattered comments distracted from the more fundamental 
developments among GOP elites and mass supporters.  
Reformers who fervently wanted to believe in GOP mavericks plugged their ears and closed 
their eyes as a chorus of climate-change denial and mockery of regulatory solutions blared out from 
the conservative media.  Such messages grew louder especially during 2007; and they reverberated 
through the GOP presidential primaries, where all other contenders attacked McCain’s residual 
expressions of support for climate science and a cap and trade system. McCain did not really stand fast 
in the face of the pressures.  As we saw in Figure 3, during his 2007-08 presidential run McCain 
stopped sponsoring environmentally backed legislation and closely hewed to the oppositional stances 
advocated by GOP Congressional leaders. And in the clearest possible signal that he was shifting his 
stance to appeal to core GOP outlooks, McCain picked as his running-mate Alaska Governor Sarah 
Palin, a flamboyant climate-science skeptic and an unabashed cheerleader for the “Drill Baby, Drill” 
approach to dealing with America’s energy challenges, greenhouse gases be damned. 
 
The Tea Party Seals the Deal 
Conservatives GOP voters may have been more firmly roped into climate change denial and McCain 
may have been returned from his maverick wanderings off the GOP reservation, but in the endgame 
Barack Obama and the Democrats scored sweeping victories in the November 2008 election.  To 
always excitable pundits, it looked as if a new era of liberal change had arrived in American politics, 
with a forward-looking president buoyed by youthful voters moving into the White House.42  Reform 
communities long denied openings geared up for new legislative pushes, including health-care 
reformers and the proponents of economy-wide carbon cabs as a tool to fight global warming.  
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Starting two months before Obama’s historic victory, the country was sliding into a deep economic 
crisis.  Bold federal government action seemed both necessary and possible, and with the Republican 
Party in disarray following huge electoral setbacks, many hoped that Obama would be able to further 
reforms with at least a modicum of cross-aisle cooperation.  Among those so hopeful was the new 
President himself, as he offered policy compromises to Congressional Republicans in the design of his 
economic stimulus legislation and proposed market-accommodating versions of health care reform 
and carbon emissions controls.  The Obama administration clearly hoped to appeal to some 
Republicans by pursuing important reform goals with modes of government action that, in the past, 
had garnered considerable business and Republican support. 
 It soon became apparent, however, that Republican leaders would not compromise. From the 
beginning, House Minority Leader John Boehner and GOP Senate leader Mitch McConnell whipped 
their caucuses to “just say no” to anything President Obama and the Democrats wanted to do.43  Their 
theory was that Republicans would never get any credit for cooperation if things went well, but if they 
refused support and obstructed legislation in the Senate, where minority filibusters could grind 
legislation and nominations to a halt, Republicans might fare better in the next elections, especially if 
he nation did not recover from economic crisis by 2010 and 2012.   
Beyond such cold-blooded strategic calculations, Republican Congressional leaders were also 
facing anger and pressure from their mass base concentrated in the South, the Inner West, and the 
Appalachian and Ozark regions. These mostly older, white, very conservative-minded voters were 
angry and fearful about Obama’s presidency – and they were also likely, day in, day out, to be 
watching Fox television and hearing incessant fear-mongering from extreme media voices like Glen 
Beck and Rush Limbaugh.  Conservative-minded Republicans were angry not just at Obama and 
Democrats, but also at “establishment” GOP leaders. McCain was considered by many to have lost 
because he was “too moderate,” and outgoing President George W. Bush was resented for increasing 
government spending and debt. Grassroots conservatives were not about to let their party’s 
Congressional leaders repeat old mistakes by cooperating with Obama’s initiatives in any area – and 
certainly not with his proposals for stimulus spending, the expansion of health insurance coverage, or 
regulations to limit greenhouse gas emissions.  Strategic considerations and popular pressures alike 
make it understandable that GOP Congressional leaders chose a “just say hell no” approach to the new 
Obama administration.   
 But hard-line strategies attempted by Congressional leaders are one thing; success in herding 
all the normally wayward Congressional cats is another.  Even if few in number, during 2009 and 
2010 there were still Republicans in both the House and Senate who represented districts and states 
where Obama won by substantial majorities; and there were GOP solons who, in the past, had taken 
substantive positions on matters like health care reform and environmental regulations that aligned 
with key provisions in bills Obama and his Congressional supporters were planning to bring to a vote. 
So how did it come to pass that, especially in the notoriously undisciplined Senate, Republicans 
proved to be extraordinarily disciplined – almost unanimously unwilling to negotiate, compromise, 
and provide votes for initiatives such as a Romney-style health reform plan or the very watered-down 
versions of cap and trade that were bruited about in the Senate in the spring of 2010?     
 Much of the answer lies in the bracing impact of the suddenly emergent Tea Party on 
Republican officeholders and candidates for office.44 Only weeks into Barack Obama’s presidency, the 
Tea Party broke out, after a February 19, 2009 “rant” by CNBC financial commentator Rick Santelli 
invoked America’s Founding Fathers to condemn the new administration’s efforts to help underwater 
home mortgage holders. In subsequent weeks, older white men and women dressed in Colonial 
costumes took to the streets in many places, carrying hand-made signs condemning Obama and his 
fellow Democrats as “Communists,” “Socialists,” and “Nazis.”  Fox News and other right-wing media 
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served as cheerleaders; and the protests were also encouraged by billionaire-backed professional 
advocacy groups that had, for years, done lobbying and political fundraising on behalf of tax cuts, 
reduced regulations on business, and efforts to privatize Social Security and Medicare.  From the 
spring of 2009 onward, ordinary grassroots citizens of a conservative bent moved to organize not just 
demonstrations, but also what ultimately became about 900 regularly meeting local Tea Parties spread 
across all fifty states.45  Those Tea Parties in turn sustained grassroots public agitation against the 
priorities of the Obama administration and the Democrats in Congress – with health care reform and 
cap and trade among the chief targets of their wrath.  In addition, Tea Party forces set out to purify and 
discipline the Republican Party, to make sure that GOP officeholders would never compromise with 
the hated Obama and Democrats.   The “Tea Party” efforts came simultaneously from below – from 
local Tea Parties and the very conservative-minded voters who made up about half of all Republican-
identified voters – and also from above – from ideological advocacy groups such as FreedomWorks 
and Americans for Prosperity and big-money political action committees like Tea Party Express that 
stood ready and able to channel millions into GOP primaries to boost uncompromising conservative 
candidates.46 
By the late summer of 2009, grassroots Tea Partiers – with television cameras following their 
every move – deployed loud demonstrators into town hall meetings convened by Democratic 
legislators in their districts. Protestors railed against House Democrats who voted for the Waxman-
Markey cap and trade legislation, and denounced those who had supported health reform bills making 
their way through various Congressional committees.47  These protests did not stop Congress from 
moving forward in either area, but they dramatized how ill-prepared Democrats and reformers were – 
especially in the cap and trade fight – to respond in kind to right-wing populist demonstrators.   
During 2010, Tea Party grassroots activists and ultra-right big money funders went on to 
aggressively reshape electoral politics.48  The biggest Tea Party impact came in GOP primaries, 
starting in Florida – where Marco Rubio knocked off the excessively moderate Charlie Crist – and 
extending to many other House, Senate, and state-level primary races. Again and again, Tea Party 
voters and funders teamed up to substitute more right-wing Republicans for slightly more moderate 
GOP officeholders or candidates. Long-serving, heretofore well-respected conservatives were among 
the displaced, such as Senator Bob Bennett in Utah;  Representative Robert Inglis in South Carolina; 
and Mike Castle in Delaware, who saw his sure-fire bid to move from the House to a vacant Senate 
seat destroyed by a Tea Party challenge from marginal candidate Christine O’Donnell.  She, of course, 
went on to lose in the general 2010 election, and the same happened to a few other extreme Tea Party 
candidates, including Sharon Angle in Nevada.  In a way it did not matter, because the Tea Party 
forces – a pincer operation including grassroots voters sure to turn out in primaries and big money 
funders who could send in checks worth hundreds of thousands or millions of dollars for television ads 
– intended to send a message to any would-be moderate or compromise-oriented Republican 
officeholders and candidates. And the message sent in 2010 was definitely received.  The 
displacement of long-entrenched GOP legislators like Castle, who had supported cap and trade 
legislation, sent a loud, intimidating message to all Republicans: Get with the no-compromise 
program, or else. Thus during 2010 GOP legislators and candidates who might conceivably 
compromise on any Democratic-leaning issues, including environmental priorities, were either picked 
off or cowed into changing their voting positions.   
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By the spring and summer of 2010, with cap and trade legislation on its last legs in the Senate, 
it was no wonder that GOP Senators ran for the hills, even those like John McCain and Lindsey 
Graham, who had formerly dallied with bipartisanship and mouthed support for climate change bills.  
During the run-up to the 2010 elections, Republican Senators pushed back against any climate-change 
legislation, and nineteen out of twenty “serious GOP Senate challengers… declared that the science of 
climate change is inconclusive or flat out incorrect.”49  The Tea Party, in short, became the enforcer 
for the lock-step anti-compromise course that GOP leaders Boehner and McConnell might not have 
been able to pull off on their own in 2009 and 2010.  
Given the crystallization of concerted GOP anti-environmentalism during Obama’s first two 
years, it took just one midterm election to go from the unanimous GOP refusal to engage on cap and 
trade in the 111th Congress to Tea Party-supported GOP efforts in the 112th Congress to roll back 
environmental laws and weaken the EPA. The November 2010 elections brought huge defeats for 
Democrats – including loss of control in the House of Representatives, losses in the Senate, and 
massive setbacks in state legislatures and governorships.  Democrats fared poorly not just because 
Republicans and Tea Partiers eagerly turned out on Election Day, but because the national economy 
was not recovering rapidly from the 2008-09 recession and many younger and minority people did not 
bother to vote. Many Americans who pulled the levers for Republicans in November 2010 did so 
without realizing how extreme and uncompromising the GOP candidates would prove to be once in 
office. Environmental issues were certainly not high on most voters’ agendas, and a majority of voters, 
including moderate Republicans, do not back extreme Tea Party positions on environmental topics. 
But whatever voters wanted, the policy after-effects of 2010 were severe.    
Following the 2010 elections, the House of Representatives took the biggest leap to the far 
right in recorded quantitative measurements of the kind political scientists use to track legislators’ 
positions.50  Prior to 2011, House Republicans already hewed more to the very conservative side than 
House Democrats leaned to the left in standard political science measurements of voting positions; but 
after the November 2010 elections, the new majority GOP House contingent registered even further to 
the nether-right, with Tea Party supported ultraconservative candidates accounting for the shift. Policy 
consequences soon became clear. The anti-regulatory, Tea Party-supporting billionaire David Koch 
visited the new GOP House as soon as new committee chairmen were installed, lobbying to make 
certain that no new regulations would be considered to deal with global warming and urging actions to 
curtail the EPA.51 House Republicans responded with a “war on the EPA,” holding hearings and 
unleashing a flood of bills to put the EPA intended to “erase decades” of laws and regulations 
protecting the environment.52  Koch-supported Republicans, many of whom signed pledges to oppose 
cap and trade, filled key committees with jurisdiction over environmental and energy issues.53  
Perhaps most telling, in order to remain in line for the chairmanship of the House Energy and 
Commerce Committee, a longstanding moderate on environmental issues, Republican Representative 
Fred Upton of Michigan, renounced his former statements suggesting that climate change is a serious 
problem and joined with Americans for Prosperity in lawsuits to keep the EPA from regulating 
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greenhouse gas emissions.54 By 2011, Beltway reporters could no longer get Republicans lawmakers 
to even acknowledge the existence of global warming issues. A December 2011 headline in the 
National Journal says it all:  “Heads in the Sand: As Climate-Change Science Moves in One 
Direction, Republicans in Congress are Moving in Another….” 55  
 The Republican run-up to the 2012 elections brought no wavering toward moderation on the 
environmental front.56  Mitt Romney had started denouncing cap and trade ideas during his 
unsuccessful bid for the 2008 GOP presidential nomination; and during the 2011-12 primary season, 
with Tea Party voters and funders holding sway, Romney adopted every priority of the oil companies, 
coal companies, opponents of green-energy subsidies, and enemies of climate change.57  Romney 
expressed doubts that human activities contribute to global warming; and like McCain in 2008 he 
propitiated his party’s extreme right wing by naming a prominent anti-environmentalist as his running 
mate.  Congressman Paul Ryan of Wisconsin, Romney’s vice-presidential pick, was groomed by 
Americans for Prosperity, a group funded by the Koch brothers that has gained a mass mailing list 
following and much greater lobbying clout during the Tea Party era.58  Throughout his Congressional 
career, Ryan has been a firm and effective opponent of environmental regulations and taxes.  
On November 6, 2012, the Romney-Ryan Republican White House ticket went down to 
defeat, as President Barack Obama was reelected to a second term by a comfortable margin. 
Republican efforts to claim control of the Senate also fell short; indeed, the Democrats actually gained 
two Senate seats, solidifying their majority, and the new Democratic Senate caucus will include a 
higher proportion of younger and in some instances more liberal members.  The Sierra Club, the 
League of Conservation Voters, and other environmental groups were pleased that their advertising 
campaigns, grassroots efforts, and financial contributions had helped to elect good people and defeat 
candidates deferential to anti-environmental industrial interests.59 But their happiness should be 
tempered.  In the 113th House that will serve through 2014, the GOP not only retains majority control 
– with all that means for initiating budget legislation and making decisions about which bills can 
advance to President Obama’s desk – it will continue to be anchored in a very strong ultra-
conservative bloc.  
At the grassroots, self-identified Tea Party sympathizers (about half of all voters who support 
the GOP) remain vigilant to punish any Republicans who compromise; and like-minded ultra-
conservative funders are not backing away from pressing their priorities on GOP officeholders. The 
“Tea Party” may now be a label unpopular with most Americans (including many Republicans), but its 
disparate grassroots and elite components are still able to buck up – and back up – Republican 
officeholders who refuse to compromise on regulations and taxes.60  More to the point, these forces 
stand ready to mount primary challenges against any GOPers who show signs of wavering. 
There is no reason, in short, to believe that today’s radicalized Republicans will be willing to 
stand down any time soon from their fierce opposition to virtually all environmental regulations and 
their refusal to countenance legislation to deal with climate change.  So extreme is the Republican 
Party center of gravity right now, and so cowed are any would-be moderates remaining in GOP ranks, 
that majority office-holding by this party – in the House of Representatives, and in half of all U.S. 
states where it remains strong – precludes any possibility of new steps to limit dirty energy subsidies 
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and regulate greenhouse emissions.  Even regulatory measures are hard to carry through when 
legislators stand ready to retaliate against agency budgets. 
 
The need for a new political approach 
The United States stands increasingly alone in the advanced industrial world in its unwillingness to 
fully acknowledge the threat of global warming, let alone use government to do anything systematic 
about it, and the consequences are global in scope. As journalist Ron Brownstein explains, “it will be 
difficult for the world to move meaningfully against climate disruption if the United States does not. 
And it will be almost impossible for the U.S. to act if one party not only rejects the most common 
solution proposed for the problem (cap-and-trade) but repudiates even the idea that there is a problem 
to be solved.”61 That is what the leverage of ultra-conservative forces in and around the Republican 
Party portends, because (as a clear-cut statement of this outlook puts it) “free-market 
environmentalism” holds “that nature should not be elevated above human and property rights” and 
“argues that private property rights and the marketplace, if not obstructed by big government, can 
better protect the environment than can big government.”62   Radicalized Republicans currently do not 
want to bargain over how best to deploy U.S. government capacities; they want to block and eviscerate 
those capacities, and in the process increase public distrust of government.  
When, exactly, the next opportunity to push for Congressional legislation to limit carbon 
emissions will arise is not easy to predict. Continued partisan deadlock in Washington DC seems 
likely for the immediate future.  The 2014 Congressional elections seem likely to further strengthen 
the hands of Republican obstructionists, because their party may take control of the U.S. Senate. Mid-
term Americans elections in non-presidential election years have much lower turnout than 
presidential-year elections, and those who turn out are skewed toward older, white, conservative-
minded Republicans – exactly the GOP base voters whose opinions have been swayed since 2006 
toward global warming skepticism.  Democrats may very well win the Senate as well as the 
presidency in 2016, but even if they triumph resoundingly in a relatively high-turnout election that 
year, it will be hard to dislodge climate-change-denying Republicans from control of the House of 
Representatives.  Another major opening for positive Congressional action to limit carbon emissions 
through legislation and back increased EPA regulations may not come before 2020. 
But if and when any new opening comes in U.S. national politics, supporters of carbon 
capping efforts are going to have to mount much more broad based efforts than they did in the cap and 
trade fight. As I have stressed, a crucial byproduct of the fights over cap and trade from 2006 to 2010 
was a renewed effort by elite climate-change deniers to influence popular views and mobilize 
grassroots forces in opposition to Congressional and EPA action. Tea Partiers and ultra-right funders 
now have the capacity to prevent most elected Republicans from compromising on tax, regulatory, or 
legislative steps to reorient the U.S. economy. Recruiting a few sympathetic business leaders will not 
suffice to counter these radical-right forces in and around the GOP.   
Even bold regulatory steps by the EPA – such as using its authority under the Clean Air Act to 
crack down on existing coal-fired electric-generating plants – are likely to be limited or undercut as 
long as GOP radicals have major leverage in Congress and in many state governments.63 Some anti-
global warming reformers are happy that the second Obama administration is trying to move forward 
through the EPA without worrying about Congress.  But there are many moderate Democrats in 
Congress who are queasy about a purely regulatory approach, and federal administrative agencies 
always have to have a modicum of backing from Congressional committees that control their budgets 
and have the authority to convene hearings and launch investigations. 
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 Here, then, is the bottom line: The political tide can be turned over the next decade only by the 
creation of a climate-change politics that includes broad popular mobilization on the center left.  That 
is what it will take to counter the recently jelled combination of free-market elite opposition and right-
wing popular mobilization against global warming remedies.  However, in stating this conclusion, I 
want to be clear about what I am not arguing. Some of the environmental left seem to be calling for a 
politics that gives up on legislative remedies – and avoids altogether the messy compromises that 
fighting for carbon-capping legislation would require – in favor of a turn toward pure “grass roots” 
organizing in local communities, states, and institutional settings such as universities. Of course, 
environmental activists can encourage (and already have achieved) very valuable steps in the states – 
such as California’s new effort to raise the cost of greenhouse gas emissions.64  And both professional 
advocates and grassroots activists can prod businesses and universities to “go green” in purchasing 
decisions and investment choices.65  These kinds of efforts add up over time – and they may in due 
course prompt corporate chieftains to support economy-wide regulations, if only to level the playing 
field and create more predictability about business costs and profit opportunities.  Some day, the 
national Republican Party might again start listening to such business leaders more closely than to 
right-wing ultra-ideologues. But rescuing the GOP from its destructive radicals will take time – not to 
mention more courage from non-Tea Party Republicans, who must rouse themselves to do that job. In 
the meantime, liberals and friendly moderates need to build a populist anti-global warming movement 
on their own side of the political spectrum.  Reformers looking to fight global warming cannot simply 
turn away from national politics.  
A successful drive to engage a majority of Americans in effective measures to fight the ill 
effects of global warming is going to have to be organized through inter-organizational networks that 
link together efforts in DC with widespread efforts in the states and localities.  That is true not only 
because many different kinds of efforts will have to unfold in complementary ways, but also because 
U.S. politics itself is institutionally structured through Congress to give local public opinion and 
advocacy a good deal of sway in national politics. In the end, members of the House and Senate will 
decide to support new laws and regulations to help nudge the economy in climate-friendly directions 
only when they think that articulate leaders and well-organized voters back in their home states and 
districts really want them to act.   
The USCAP effort of the 2000s was premised on the idea that a legislative proposal had to 
express the shared, pre-compromised interests of “inside players” – the belief that a carbon-capping 
plan should embody a bargain hammered out among national environmental organizations and 
corporations. Although they may not have realized it, the CEOs in USCAP were basing their efforts on 
a tacit (and mistaken) assumption about how U.S. politics works. USCAP principals tried to work out 
economic compromises among stakeholder groups – corporations, unions, regional industries – 
because they thought this would set the stage to get bills through key committees and the two houses 
of Congress. Endless time was spent negotiating the exact regulatory targets for carbon-emissions 
reduction and details about the allocation of free “allowances” to polluters. In essence, the USCAP 
bargainers put in so much effort because they thought that if heads of professional environmental 
organizations and corporate chieftains could lay down together like lambs with lions, then 
Congressional committee leaders would accept the plan, only need to put the finishing touches on the 
bargains by throwing extra sops here and there to regional or business interests of special importance 
to key legislators. Voila, the job would be done. Properly brokered legislation would pass and head to 
Obama’s desk. 
What’s wrong with this?  Some might answer that deals with businesses, especially deals with 
“devils” in the “dirty energy” sectors, are inherently immoral.  I do not agree; there is nothing 
inherently wrong with bargains that involve business interests; and strange-bedfellow coalitions can 
sometimes be very effective in politics. Rather, the difficulty with the blueprint strategy is that 
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USCAP tried to operate as if the United States were a parliamentary democracy where a pre-brokered 
bargain could just be handed to the legislature and the executive. But that is not how U.S. politics 
works at all.  American governing institutions do not lend themselves to control by corporatist 
bargainers.   
In many parliamentary systems, if policy advocates can broker a bargain among nationally 
organized representatives of business, labor, and public interest advocacy organizations, then it is 
often easy enough to get the bargain through parliament. The majority party or coalition can crack the 
whip. But in the United States, law-making power is divided between the executive branch and a 
sovereign Congress run by disparate committees and full of representatives separately elected from 
states and hundreds of local districts. In this decentralized, federalist polity, corporatist bargaining 
rarely works, and certainly cannot succeed amidst ideological polarization when widely organized 
forces can mount counter-pressures through states and districts. The U.S. president cannot crack the 
legislative whip, and legislators often respond to local and interest group pressures more readily than 
to their own party’s leaders.  In any event, legislators and Congressional committees insist on having 
an independent say about the provisions included or excluded from every major piece of legislation.   
What alternative policy approach might serve as the basis for a strategy of popular 
mobilization through inter-organizational alliances stretching into states and localities? In my view, 
the most promising approach would be some variant of what has been called the “cap and dividend” 
approach to limiting carbon emissions.66  Like cap and trade, cap and dividend measures aim to raise 
the price of carbon-based energy production and use.  They may place a tax on producers or importers 
of such energy, or they may establish a regulatory cap and sell permits at gradually escalating prices.  
But permits are not given away (and corporations may not be allowed to compensate for domestic 
emissions by paying, say, for rain forest plantings abroad, because such diversions are difficult to track 
and measure). Crucially, the substantial revenues that are raised from a tax or sales of permits are put 
into a public trust fund; and most of the proceeds are divvied up each year to pay “dividend” checks to 
every individual citizen.  
Politically speaking, the cap and dividend route has a number of advantages. Instead of 
building political support by bargaining with industrial interests about how many permits they may get 
cheaply or for free, the cap and dividend approach makes it possible to speak with average citizens 
about what they might gain as well as pay during the transitional period of increasing prices for energy 
from carbon sources. Cap and dividend is simple to spell out and it is also relatively transparent. 
Citizens could understand and trust this policy.  Like Social Security, taxes or proceeds from auctions 
are collected for a separate trust fund – and the revenues are used to pay for broadly valued benefits 
for each citizen and every family.  No opaque, messy, corrupt insider deals.  The dividend payments 
also deliver a relatively greater economic pay-off to the least-well off individuals and families, 
precisely the people who, as energy prices rise, would have to spend more of their incomes as home 
heating, electricity, and gasoline. Popularly rooted organizations like labor unions, churches, and old 
people’s associations might rally behind such an approach, because it is economically just in its 
impact.67   
For some years after it started, a cap and dividend system would reduce the expanding income 
inequalities that have plagued American society and politics in recent decades.68 Some global warming 
warriors speak as if social benefits and economic fairness are not “their issues,” but all U.S. 
environmentalists should recognize that they have a stake in combating income inequality. 
Environmentalism has a reputation for appealing mostly to white, upper-middle-class educated 
citizens, even as stagnating wages for less privileged Americans have made it easy for right-wing 
forces to demonize carbon-capping as a new tax that will burden already hard-pressed families. Cap 
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and dividend would allow anti-global warming advocates to say – loud and clear, and very truthfully – 
that promoting cleaner energy will also boost the economic fortunes of average Americans. The claim 
would not have to rest only on pie-in-the-sky green energy jobs.  Those jobs will appear, indeed are 
already appearing in the tens of thousands, but the promise of future jobs for some people is not going 
to be enough to counter right-wing scare campaigns that stoke the well-founded economic anxieties of 
the majority.  Reformers who want to remake energy use in the United States need to deliver concrete 
economic help to ordinary families along the way, and ideally they should do it in easy-to-understand, 
transparent ways.  
A cap and dividend approach could be advantageous for many environmental activists and 
green businesses, too.  Each year, when the dividend checks go out, environmental advocacy groups 
could ask their supporters to donate a portion of the dividend to their causes, thus rechanneling some 
of the money raised by capping carbon emissions to pay for complementary kinds of environmental 
advocacy.  Environmental groups, along with nonprofits, religious groups, and citizens’ groups could 
encourage local businesses, nonprofits, and families to install energy-saving devices that would, in 
effect, allow more of the rebates to go for purposes other than offsetting higher electricity and gasoline 
prices. Furthermore, the yearly arrival of the dividends would allow green businesses to advertise 
energy-saving appliances, cars, and home-heating solutions. They could say to Americans that “an 
investment in new green technology is a good use for this year’s dividend check, and it will allow you 
to keep more of next year’s check.”  The ads practically write themselves.   
There is, in short, a real choice to be made about the kind of policy strategy and coalition-
building that could enable the United States to enact and sustain effective carbon caps. For inside the 
Beltway types, the easy choice will be to try ever more insider efforts to get a cap and trade system or 
carbon taxes, with new revenues to be dispensed in relatively opaque ways through complicated 
stakeholder bargains. But for strategists who suspect that more of the same kind of politics will not 
work, cap and dividend approaches hold the possibility of constructing a new political movement in 
the next few years.  A well prepared drive for cap and dividend might well bring together 
environmental advocates, green businesses, and many unions and citizen associations to support the 
enactment of carbon-emissions caps and the subsequent ratcheting-up of the tax levels to ensure that 
the United States completes a transition to a green economy, with ordinary citizens reaping economic 
benefits along the way.  Values and moral vision would inspire action, of course, but so would 
pocketbook payoffs for most families and future-oriented businesses.  Doing good and doing well 
would go hand in hand.  
My careful look back at the cap and trade failure in 2009 and 2010 underlines a 
straightforward lesson: Without sustained pressures and inspiration from outside the Beltway, the U.S. 
Congress will never do what is needed to enact new energy regulations and sustain them from counter-
pressures over the years it will take to transform energy use in the world’s leading national economy. 
The only way to counter U.S. right-wing elite and popular forces is to build a broad popular movement 
to tackle climate change.  Most voters will need to engage in this battle if it is to have any chance of 
success, so Americans who want a new, sustainable economy cannot leave any part of the effort, 
including the drive for new emissions legislation, entirely in the hands of honchos striking bargains in 
back rooms.  Citizens must mobilize and many organizations must work together in a sustained 
democratic movement to build a green economy in the United States – and beyond. 
 
 

  
 
